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Abstract
Although many sports leagues are viewed as monopolies, research suggests that some
economic competition exists between teams in different sports leagues. If fans make
consumption choices based on the quality of all teams that are present in their region,
then economic competition and ownership structure can impact an owner’s incentive to
invest in talent. This article examines differences between monopolists, duopolists and
cross-ownership. Consumer preferences and fan loyalty are allowed to vary across sports,
and the winning percentages of teams in other leagues affects demand. Our model shows
that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to a
monopolist. A firm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to
a duopolist, but the difference in profits is ambiguous. League policies are studied and
are shown to affect the quality of teams in other leagues.
Keywords: Sports Leagues, Talent Investment, Ownership Structures
JEL classification: L83
1 Introduction
Much has been made about the effects of monopoly power in professional sports leagues.
Major League Baseball (MLB) has antitrust exemption and the other North American
major professional leagues enjoy similar market structures. Most teams in these leagues
have gained regional monopoly power by eliminating local competition in the same league.
This has inspired a substantial body of research that focuses on player talent investment
by teams and how league policies change these investments and the competitive balance
of the league. However, if game attendees, television viewers, and advertisers are choosing
between teams in different sports, then leagues do have economic competitors from other
leagues. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for European football fans to be choosing
between multiple teams in the same sport in the same region, but in different leagues.
Given that there is economic competition between sports leagues, this study examines
the impact that the quality of teams in other leagues has on an owner’s incentive to invest
in talent under various circumstances. In addition, we model the effect of a single owner
owning two teams in separate leagues (cross-ownership) and also the effects of league
policies across different leagues. Consistent with economic intuition, we find that cross-
ownership reduces an owner’s incentive to invest in talent. However, not as intuitive is
that economic competition can either increase or decrease team quality.
Most analysts have argued that an increase in competition will lead to a decrease in
investment. For instance, both former MLB commissioner Bowie Kuhn and MLB’s Blue
Ribbon Panel Report recommended putting a third team in New York to help competitive
balance (Zimbalist 2003). As our paper shows, economic competition could increase the
incentive to win for large market teams under certain conditions since fans would have
more alternatives. Even less intuitive is that cross-ownership may result in lower profit
levels compared to duopolists. That is, if there are two teams in a market, but in different
leagues, it may be profitable to have two separate owners. This result occurs because
other teams in the league, but outside the region, may increase their talent investment
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under cross-ownership. Regarding league policies, our paper shows that under certain
conditions, an increase in a salary cap in one league can decrease talent levels of some
teams in other leagues and that revenue sharing directly mitigates some of the effects of
cross-ownership.
Sports leagues have been modeled as revenue being determined by winning and tal-
ent (El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Quirk and El Hodiri (1974), Fort and Quirk (1995),
Vrooman (1995), Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and Kesenne (2004)). These models have
substantially progressed the understanding of the behavior of professional sport leagues
as well as provided insights into the effects of league policies such as salary caps and
revenue sharing on profits, competitive balance, and player salaries. We build upon these
models by including the effect of economic competition of the quality from teams in other
leagues into the owner’s objective function. Because of this, the common ownership of
teams across leagues and the cross-league effects of league policies become important.
The study of economic competition within and across professional sports leagues is a
growing area of empirical research.1 Dealing with competition within a league, Winfree
et al. (2004) show that the presence of MLB teams decreased the attendance of other
MLB teams in the region. Evidence also suggests that when two teams are located in the
same region fans are responsive to the quality changes of the other team in the region
(Miller, 2006). This implies that fans have various levels of loyalty toward sports teams.
Furthermore, Henrickson (forthcoming) found that teams price strategically based on
the presence of other sports franchises and that competition can affect team location
decisions.
There is also evidence that fans substitute between teams in other leagues. Re-
searchers have used the 2004-05 National Hockey League (NHL) lockout as a natural
experiment to examine how fans substituted to other leagues. Winfree and Fort (2008)
find that in the absence of the NHL, minor league hockey teams located in the same
city as an NHL team increased their attendance by 9 percent (although statistically in-
1While not focusing directly on fans switching between teams, there is also a literature on fan loyalty
(Wakefield and Sloan (1995), Dawson and Downward (2000), Depken II (2000), and Depken II (2001)).
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significant) and junior league hockey teams by 19.9 percent. Rascher et al. (2009) found
that minor league hockey teams increased attendance an average of 2 percent during the
lockout. Both Winfree (2009a) and Rascher et al. (2009) show that a substitution effect
also exists between National Basketball Association (NBA) teams and NHL teams. In
the year of the lockout, attendance of NBA teams increased by 3 to 4 percent in cities
where NHL teams were located. However, since NHL revenues are smaller, the increase in
attendance in the NBA represented about 6-7 percent of NHL revenues. Winfree (2009b)
finds that over the past decade when teams from other major North American sports
leagues exited a market, incumbent teams increased short run attendance by 5.5 percent
on average. Most recently, Robinson (forthcoming) gives evidence that European foot-
ball fans will switch allegiances. It is often the case that fans are switching allegiances
between teams in the same sport but different leagues given the promotion and relega-
tion system in European football in which teams often switch leagues. Furthermore, it is
often the case that teams in different leagues, but in the same region, often compete for
advertising, sponsorship, and luxury suite sales from companies. These revenue sources
also depend on the relative quality of the teams.
If fan allegiances are slow to change, one might expect the long run fan substitution
to be greater than short run fan substitution. Table 1 shows the average local broadcast
ratings for most NBA teams from the 1999-2000 season to the 2004-2005 season. This
gives evidence of much higher television ratings in markets without other major sports
competitors. Further, more sophisticated statistical analyses have been done showing
that demand for teams for both attendance and media is higher in markets without other
sports teams (Paul, 2003; Tainsky, 2010; Mongeon and Winfree, forthcoming).
Given that cross-league substitution effects exist, the study of the cross-ownership
of teams in different leagues becomes important area of analysis. Most cross-ownership
involves teams in separate leagues in the same city. However, the National Football
League (NFL) is an exception. While NFL owners may own other major sports franchises,
they may not do so in an NFL market. Therefore, we use MLB, NBA, and the NHL for
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a benchmark. Table 2 shows cross-ownership groups between teams in MLB, NBA,
and the NHL.2 Of the 24 cases of cross-ownership that we have identified, only one is
between teams that are located in different regions.3 To provide a relative measure of the
prevalence of cross-ownership, Figure 1 depicts the number of markets with more than
one major league team and the number of cross-owned firms over time.4 The number
of cities that contain more than one team changes over time from league expansion and
team relocations. Figure 1 shows that the number of markets with one team from each
of the three leagues increased from 7 to 14 from 1970 to 2007, while, the amount of
cross-ownership increased from 2 to 9.5
The study of the effects of league policies on an owner’s incentive to invest in talent is
not new to the literature. However, to our knowledge, no one has examined the effects of
a league policy on another league. If some fans are choosing between teams in different
leagues based on their quality, and league policies affect team quality level, then leagues
and teams should be aware of the policies of other leagues.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: section 2 sets up team models and compares
the different incentives for owners to invest in talent across different market structures.
Section 3 examines the effect of cross-ownership. Section 4 determines the impact of
league policies in alternate leagues, section 5 gives an example with functional forms, and
section 6 concludes and discusses some implications.
2Many of the ownership groups presented in Table 2 also own teams beyond the leagues of MLB,
NBA, and the NHL, including minor or junior league teams, Major League Soccer (MLS) teams, and
Arena Football League (AFL) teams. For conciseness, teams from these leagues are not included in the
table. Since larger markets have more teams, cross-ownership is more common in the larger markets.
3From this point forward, when we refer to cross-ownership we are implying the cross-ownership of
teams that are located in the same city.
4For example, two cross-owned teams are counted as one cross-owned firm.
5While the amount of cross-ownership has increased over the last few decades it is not necessarily
a result of anti-competitive behavior. For example, it may be more efficient to own multiple teams.
Although beyond the scope of this article, vertical relationships exist between teams and media entities,
concession companies or other vertically related firms as well.
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2 Talent investment with competition across leagues
We first consider a two-team league monopoly as a base case. We define a monopolist
as being the only team, in that league or otherwise, in the region. In this model, talent
investment by each team determines the winning percentage for each team, which in turn
determines revenue. Also, the winning percentages of both teams in a league must add
up to one. The profit function for a monopolist is given by,
pia1 = Ra1(wa1(ta1, ta2))− ta1 (1)
and the profit function for the other team in the league is given by,
pia2 = Ra2(wa2(ta2, ta1))− ta2 (2)
Where Ra1 is the revenue of team 1 in league a, w represents winning percentage and
t is the talent investment. We assume that revenue increases when winning increases,
dRa1
dwa1
> 0, winning increases (or does not decrease) when talent investment increases,
∂wa1
∂ta1
≥ 0, but at a decreasing rate, ∂2wa1
∂t2a1
< 0, and winning decreases when the opposing
team increases talent investment, ∂wa1
∂ta2
< 0. Also, if one team does not invest in talent
then the other team wins all of the games (wa1(ta1, 0) = 1 implying
∂wa1
∂ta1
= 0 when
ta2 = 0), but some investment will lead to a winning percentage greater than zero (if
ta1 > 0 and ta2 > 0 then 0 < wa1 < 1). We further assume that the marginal impact of
talent investment on revenue is positive, but at a decreasing rate so that ∂Ra1
∂ta1
> 0, and
∂2Ra1
∂t2a1
< 0. The first order conditions for both teams are,
∂pia1
∂ta1
=
dRa1
dwa1
∂wa1
∂ta1
− 1 = 0 (3)
and
∂pia2
∂ta2
=
dRa2
dwa2
∂wa2
∂ta2
− 1 = 0 (4)
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Equations (3) and (4) imply that both teams will invest in talent to the point where the
contribution of talent on revenue equals the cost of talent and in equilibrium, dRa1
dwa1
∂wa1
∂ta1
=
dRa2
dwa2
∂wa2
∂ta2
.6
From this point on we do make the assumption that if winning has a greater impact
on total revenue,7 that is if dTRa1
dwa1
shifts up, then the talent investment for that team will
increase and the team will win more games. However, it is possible that this is not the
case. Appendix A shows under what conditions an increase in dTRa1
dwa1
leads to an increase
in winning percentage.
We now consider the duopolist’s case where there are two teams from different leagues
in the market. In this case, some fans’ tastes are diverse, so that there are both sport-
specific fans8 and general sports fans. Sport-specific fans only consume a specific sport
and their purchasing decisions are based entirely on the quality of that specific team,
regardless of the presence of a competing team in the market. In contrast, general sports
fans will potentially consume any sport that is in the market and their consumption
choice depends on the quality of all of the teams in the market. We assume that there
are two teams in each league. However, for simplicity, we assume that team 1 in each
league is in the same market, but team 2 in league a and team 2 in league b are in different
markets and do not compete with each other economically.
For the duopolist, the function γ represents the proportion of total fans relative to the
monopoly case. It is a closed bounded set between zero and one and depends on the win-
ning percentages of both teams in the market. Therefore, γa1(wa1(ta1, ta2), wb1(tb1, tb2))Ra1
6There has been some debate in the sports economics literature about how talent investment affects
the investment of the other teams in the league (Szymanski (2004), Eckard(2006), Szymanski (2006)).
In particular, North American sports leagues are considered to have a fixed supply of talent(with some
exceptions such as Major League Soccer), while European leagues have an elastic supply. Therefore, if
this model is applied to European style leagues, talent investment could simply be considered talent.
That is, an increase in talent investment by one team does not change the talent level of the other team.
In North American style leagues, it is assumed that the two teams invest in talent, which is distributed
between the two teams, and then determines winning percentages. Either way, winning is a function of
talent investment.
7Up to this point we have denoted the monopolist’s revenue as R. However, later in the paper team
revenue is compared to the monopolist’s revenue and is a percentage of R. Therefore we define total
revenue as all revenue generated by that team.
8These fans could also be considered league-specific fans.
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represents total revenue. If the leagues are not economic competitors, then γ = 1. How-
ever, if we assume the leagues are economic competitors, γ is a non-decreasing function
of the team’s winning percentage, ∂γa1
∂wa1
≥ 0, and a non-increasing function of the other
team’s winning percentage, ∂γa1
∂wb1
≤ 0.
The profit function for the duopolist is
pia1 = γa1(wa1(ta1, ta2), (wb1(tb1, tb2))Ra1(wa1(ta1, ta2))− ta1 (5)
And the first order condition is given by,
∂pia1
∂ta1
=
(
∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 + γa1
dRa1
dwa1
)
∂wa1
∂ta1
− 1 = 0 (6)
The change in total revenue from winning for the duopolist is divided into two parts,
∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 and γa1
dRa1
dwa1
. The product ∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 is the revenue gained from the additional
non-sport specific fans that attend the game due to a one-unit increase in the team’s own
winning percentage. The product γa1
dRa1
dwa1
is the additional revenue generated from a one-
unit increase in winning percentage from fans that are not switching leagues. The sum
of the two products, ∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 + γa1
dRa1
dwa1
, represents a more general form of the marginal
revenue than the monopolist’s. If γ = 1 and ∂γa1
∂wa1
= 0, then equation (3) is equivalent to
equation (6).
A team entering a market leads to an ambiguous effect on talent investment for the
incumbent team. If a team enters a market and the fan base of market 1 is simply divided
into loyal fans of team a and loyal fans of team b, ∂γa1
∂wa1
= 0 and γ < 1, then, essentially, the
incumbent team has become a smaller market team. However, if instead the two teams
are competing for non-loyal fans, the teams might have a stronger incentive to invest in
talent, which is somewhat different than conventional wisdom.9 Comparing equations (6)
9Although we are modeling different leagues, the same intuition holds for teams in the same market
in the same league. It is often argued that putting a third baseball team in New York will help Major
League Baseball’s competitive balance since it would decrease the talent investment of the New York
Yankees (Zimbalist 2003).
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and (3), if ∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 > (1− γa1)dRa1dwa1 then the duopolist will invest more in talent than the
monopolist since the marginal revenue from talent investment has increased. However,
(1−γa1)dRa1dwa1 can be either greater or less than
∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1. This results leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 If fans are loyal, then owners will invest less in talent in the presence of
another league. If fans are not loyal, then the effect of the presence of another team on
talent investment is ambiguous.
It should also be noted that loyalty in this case means something relatively specific. In
this case, loyalty implies that a fan will only be a fan of one team in a two team market,
but in the absence of their favorite team, they will be a fan of the other team.
We now examine the effect of a marginal change of talent investment by team 1 in
league b on team 1 in league a. Differentiating equation (6) gives us,
∂2pia1
∂ta1∂tb1
=
∂wa1
∂ta1
∂wb1
∂tb1
(
∂2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 +
∂γa1
∂wb1
dRa1
dwa1
)
(7)
The sign of equation (7) is ambiguous and introduces a strategic effect10, ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
. Little
can be said about the sign or magnitude of ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
without a functional form.11 However,
if the preceding term is not sufficiently large, an increase in the economic competitor’s
talent investment will cause a decrease in the team’s marginal revenue from talent, thereby
decreasing their talent level.12
The two-league two-team model also introduces an indirect effect. Changes in the
investment of talent of team 2 in league b (in a third market separate from team 2 in
league a) will affect the winning percent of team 1 in league b , which, in turn, will affect
the revenue of team 1 league a. A marginal increase in talent of the team in market 2 in
10Strategic effects are defined by Tirole (1988).
11If the logistic form were imposed on γa1 such that γa1 =
f(wa1)
f(wa1)+f(wb1)
, then ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
= f
′
a1f
′
b1(fa1−fb1)
(fa1+fb1)3
which is greater than zero if and only if fa1 > fb1
12Talent acts as strategic substitutes if ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
< − ∂γa1∂wb1 dRa1dwa1 and strategic complements otherwise.
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league b affects team 1 in league a in the following way,
∂2pia1
∂ta1∂tb2
=
∂wa1
∂ta1
∂wb1
∂tb2
(
∂2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 +
∂γa1
∂wb1
dRa1
dwa1
)
(8)
Equation (8) has one term that is different than equation (7), ∂wb1
∂tb2
replaces ∂wb1
∂tb1
which
are opposite in sign. Therefore, the sign of equation (8) is the opposite as the sign in
equation (7).
3 Cross-ownership
As stated, cross-ownership is a common ownership among competing teams located within
the same region. If team 1 in league a and team 1 in league b are owned by the same
owner, the profit function for a cross-owned firm is given by,
pia1,b1 = γa1(wa1(ta1, ta2), (wb1(tb1, tb2))Ra1(wa1(ta1, ta2))− ta1 +
γb1(wb1(tb1, tb2), (wa1(ta1, ta2))Rb1(wb1(tb1, tb2))− tb1 (9)
The revenue and cost of talent of team b is included in the profit function. The first order
condition is given by,
∂pia1,b1
∂ta1
=
(
∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 + γa1
dRa1
dwa1
+
∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1
)
∂wa1
∂ta1
− 1 = 0 (10)
Compared to the duopolist, the cross-owner’s first order condition includes an additional
term, ∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1. Since that term is non-positive, this implies the cross-owner will invest the
same or less in talent compared to the duopolist. An important change of the cross-owned
firm is: in solving the joint profit maximization problem, the externalities between the
teams are eliminated. This captures the reduction in revenue for team 1 in league b from
the decrease in fans due to the marginal increase in winning percentage from team 1 in
league a.
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Proposition 2 The cross-owned firm will invest less in talent than the duopolist if there
is any substitutability between teams in the same market.
For a similar reason as the duopolist the cross-owned firm’s level of talent compared to
the monopolist is ambiguous. However, since the talent level of the crossowned teams
is less than the duopolist’s talent level, cross-ownership does make it more likely that
investment is lower than the monopolist’s investment. Comparing equations (10) and
(3), if (1 − γ)dRa1
dwa1
> ∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 +
∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1 then the monopolist will have a higher talent
level, otherwise the cross-owner will have a higher level of talent investment.
However, given that team 2 in league a and team 2 in league b will change their
investment in talent, the change in profits from a duopolist to a cross-owner is ambiguous.
If the cross-owned teams are in a large market and reduce their investment in talent when
they become cross-owned, the other teams in the league may have an incentive to increase
their talent level. So, while the cross-owner would essentially have a regional monopoly,
there are strategic substitutes in the form of talent investment for other teams in the
league. This is analogous to having losses from horizontal mergers. Salant et al. (1983)
showed that in a three firm market, if two firms merge, the third will respond by increasing
output and thus decreasing profits of the merged firm. Similarly, if a team is cross-owned,
other teams in the league might respond by increasing their talent level due to decrease
in talent of the cross-owned firm.
Proposition 3 The effect of cross-ownership, compared to a duopolist, on profits is am-
biguous.
4 League Policies
4.1 Salary Cap
Given that the winning percentages of teams in other leagues are in the owner’s objective
function, talent levels across leagues are linked. The purpose of this section is to determine
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the conditions under which league policies affect other leagues’ talent levels. For example,
when the NHL first introduced the salary cap in 2005-06, teams were forced to keep
salaries under $39 million. The salary cap for 2009-10 was $56.8 million. Do the changes
in the salary cap that the NHL implemented after the 2004-05 lockout affect the quality
of teams in the NBA? In this context, a salary cap is a limit on the investment in talent.13
To analyze the effects of a salary cap on the quality of teams in other leagues, we assume
that a salary cap is present in a league and determine the impact of a marginal change
in the salary cap. The following three cases exist when analyzing a salary cap.
1. The salary cap is not binding on any team. This scenario is trivial and not
considered.
2. The salary cap is binding on all teams in the same league. In this case, both teams
are expected to win half of their games.14 If the cap is binding on both teams, then there
is no effect on winning percentages from a marginal change in a cap, and therefore no
effect on the quality of teams in other leagues. This scenario is not considered.
3. The salary cap is only binding on the large market team. In this case, the salary
cap will affect the quality of both teams in the league and therefore the quality of teams
in other leagues. This scenario is considered because of it’s affects across leagues.
So, for our purposes, we assume that the cap is only binding on the large market
team. We first explore the case of a duopoly with no cross-ownership. Given that team 1
in each league is in the same market, we assume that they are in the large market and are
impacted by the salary cap. Further, we will assume the salary cap is on team 1 in league
b and look at the impact on team 1 in league a. Since we assume the cap is binding, the
mathematical representation of the binding cap is, dtb1
dCAP
= 1. Therefore, the marginal
effect of a salary cap on a team in a different league located in the large market is,
∂2pia1
∂ta1∂CAP
=
∂2pia1
∂ta1∂tb1
dtb1
dCAP
=
∂wa1
∂ta1
∂wb1
∂tb1
(
∂2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 +
∂γa1
∂wb1
dRa1
dwa1
)
(11)
13Investment in talent can be very broad and represent such things as payroll and/or player develop-
ment. For simplicity, we assume that the cap is on investment in talent, but typically a cap is on payroll.
If the cap is not on the total investment in talent it will have a mitigating effect.
14We assume the contest success function is the same for both teams.
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This is completely analogous to equation (7). In fact, a marginal increase in a binding
cap will be the same as a marginal increase in talent. Therefore, as long as ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
is not
sufficiently large, an increase in the salary cap for league b will cause a decrease in talent
investment for the team in league a. Conversely, implementing a salary cap in league b
will increase investment for teams in league a in the same markets assuming that ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
is not too large.
Proposition 4 If a competing team in the same market but a different league incurs a
salary cap, then a team will increase their talent level if strategic effects are not large.
The case of a salary cap with cross-ownership is similar to the case of a salary cap in
a duopoly. Again, assuming the cap is binding so that dtb1
dCAP
= 1, the marginal effect of a
increase in a salary cap on a cross-owned team in a different league located in the large
market is,
∂2pia1,b1
∂ta1∂CAP
=
∂2pia1,b1
∂ta1∂tb1
dtb1
dCAP
=
∂wa1
∂ta1
∂wb1
∂tb1
(
∂2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 +
∂γa1
∂wb1
dRa1
dwa1
+ ∂
2γb1
∂wa1∂wb1
Rb1 +
∂γb1
∂wa1
dRb1
dwb1
)
(12)
Which is similar to equation (11).
4.2 Revenue Sharing
Next we will examine the impact that revenue sharing has on other leagues. The result
that revenue sharing reduces the incentive to invest in talent for all teams within a league
is well established. However, the effect of revenue sharing on competing leagues is yet to
be explored.
We assume that league b has a revenue sharing policy and we first examine the effects
on league b. The profit functions for the two teams in league b are,15
pib1 = αγb1(wb1(tb1, tb2), wa1(ta1, ta2))Rb1(wb1(tb1, tb2))+(1−α)Rb2(wb2(tb2, tb1))− tb1 (13)
15We have assumed that team 2 in league b is a monopolist, therefore, they have no γ function.
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and
pib2 = (1−α)γb1(wb1(tb1, tb2), wa1(ta1, ta2))Rb1(wb1(tb1, tb2))+αRb2(wb2(tb2, tb1))− tb2 (14)
where α ∈ (.5, 1) is the proportion of an owner’s revenue that is retained by the owner
and pays 1− α to their opponents. The first order conditions are,
∂pib1
∂tb1
= α
∂wb1
∂tb1
(
∂γb1
∂wb1
Rb1 + γb1
dRb1
dwb1
)
+ (1− α)
(
dRb2
dwb2
∂wb2
∂tb1
)
− 1 = 0 (15)
and
∂pib2
∂tb2
= (1− α)∂wb1
∂tb2
(
∂γb1
∂wb1
Rb1 + γb1
dRb1
dwb1
)
+ α
(
dRb2
dwb2
∂wb2
∂tb2
)
− 1 = 0 (16)
Given that in a two-team league model, ∂wb1
∂tb1
= −∂wb2
∂tb1
and ∂wb2
∂tb2
= −∂wb1
∂tb2
, the following
equilibrium condition is obtained.
(
∂γb1
∂wb1
Rb1 + γb1
dRb1
dwb1
)(
α
∂wb1
∂tb1
+ (1− α)∂wb2
∂tb2
)
=
dRb2
dwb2
(
α
∂wb2
∂tb2
+ (1− α)∂wb1
∂tb1
)
(17)
As previously discussed in equation (6), the first term in (17) is the duopolist’s
marginal revenue of winning. Therefore, if we denote dTRb1
dwb1
= ∂γb1
∂wb1
Rb1 + γb1
dRb1
dwb1
then
equation (17) can be written as,
dTRb1
dwb1
(
α
∂wb1
∂tb1
+ (1− α)∂wb2
∂tb2
)
=
dRb2
dwb2
(
α
∂wb2
∂tb2
+ (1− α)∂wb1
∂tb1
)
(18)
Equation (18) represents the equilibrium condition for the winning percent in the two-
team league. If team 1 is the large market team, then decreasing returns to investment
implies that ∂wb1
∂tb1
< ∂wb2
∂tb2
. Therefore, an increase in revenue sharing (a decrease in α )
results in dTRb1
dwb1
(
α∂wb1
∂tb1
+ (1− α)∂wb2
∂tb2
)
> dRb2
dwb2
(
α∂wb2
∂tb2
+ (1− α)∂wb1
∂tb1
)
. Given diminishing
returns to talent on revenues, an increase (decrease) in talent for the large (small) market
team will make the LHS (RHS) smaller (larger). Consequently, the large market team
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will improve relative to the small market team.16
We now focus on the effect of revenue sharing on other leagues. If teams a1 and b1 are
in the large market, then dwb1
dα
< 0, implying that revenue sharing in league b will increase
the winning percentage for team b1. Therefore, revenue sharing in league b will have the
same qualitative effect on the large market team as an increase in talent of team b1; which
is the same condition as in equation (7). That is, assuming ∂
2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 < − ∂γa1∂wb1 dRa1dwa1 ,
and team 1 is in the large market, then revenue sharing in league b will cause an increase
in winning percentage for team 1 in league b and a decrease in winning percentage and
talent investment for team 1 in league a.
We now move on to revenue sharing with cross-ownership. If revenue sharing exists
in league b , then the corresponding profit function for the cross-owned team is given by,
pia1,b1 = γa1(wa1(ta1, ta2), (wb1(tb1, tb2))Ra1(wa1(ta1, ta2))− ta1 +
αγb1(wb1(tb1, tb2), (wa1(ta1, ta2))Rb1(wb1(tb1, tb2)) +
(1− α)Rb2(wb2(tb2, tb1))− tb1 (19)
The first order condition for team a is given by,
∂pia1,b1
∂ta1
=
(
∂γa1
∂wa1
Ra1 + γa1
dRa1
dwa1
+ α
∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1
)
∂wa1
∂ta1
− 1 = 0 (20)
The direct effect of revenue sharing is derived by comparing the first order conditions
of the cross-owned firm with (equation (20)) and without (10) revenue sharing. While
cross-owners will invest less in talent then duopolists, the effect is mitigated with revenue
sharing.
However, there is also an indirect effect of team 2 in league b also investing less.
Revenue sharing also has a strategic effect by altering the quality of the team in the
other market, the cross-owned team, by affecting the team’s marginal revenue in the
16Syzmanski (2004) has a similar conclusion using functional forms.
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following way
∂2pia1,b1
∂ta1∂α
= ∂wa1
∂ta1
(
∂wb1
∂tb1
∂tb1
∂α
+ ∂wb1
∂tb2
∂tb2
∂α
)
(
∂2γa1
∂wa1∂wb1
Ra1 + α
∂2γb1
∂wa1∂wb1
Rb1 +
∂γa1
∂wb1
dRa1
dwa1
+ α ∂γb1
∂wa1
dRb1
dwb1
)
+ ∂wa1
∂ta1
∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1 (21)
The term ∂wb1
∂tb1
∂tb1
∂α
+ ∂wb1
∂tb2
∂tb2
∂α
is the effect of revenue sharing on the winning percentage
of team 1 in league b. Continuing to assume team 1 is the large market team, then
∂wb1
∂tb1
∂tb1
∂α
+ ∂wb1
∂tb2
∂tb2
∂α
< 0 , or in words, less revenue sharing leads to a lower winning
percentage for team 1 in league b. However, if the effect on winning percentages in league
b is small, then the term ∂γb1
∂wa1
Rb1 will make equation (21) negative. This is because
revenue sharing decreases the incentive to not take away fans from team 1 in league b.
Proposition 5 If a league implements revenue sharing and it has a small effect on the
winning percentages of that league, then revenue sharing will lead to higher levels of
investment for cross-owners for teams not in that league.
5 An Example
In this section we give an example with functional forms. Suppose for the large market
monopolist the profit is given by pia1 = σa1
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
)
− ta1 where wai = taitai+taj and σa1 is a
constant greater than one. For the small market team we assume that profit is given by
pia2 =
ta2
ta1+ta2
− ta2. After taking first order conditions and solving for each teams talent,
winning, and profit in terms of the exogenous parameter, we find that ta1 =
1(
1+ 1
σa1
)2 ,
ta2 =
1
σa1
(
1+ 1
σa1
)2 , wa1 = σa11+σa1 , wa2 = 11+σa1 , pia1 = σ3a1(1+σa1)2 and pib1 = 1(1+σa1)2 .
Now suppose the large market team is a duopolist and their profit function is given by,
pia1 =
[
φ1 + φ2
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
− wb1
)]
σa1
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
)
− ta1 where wb1 represents the winning per-
centage of the team in the same market, but different league. We will assume the profit
function of team 2 in league a does not change. In this case, the winning percentage of
the duopolist is given by, wa1 =
2σa1φ2−φ1+wb1φ2−1+
√
(2σa1φ2−φ1+wb1φ2−1)2+8σ2a1φ2(φ1−wb1φ2)
4σa1φ2
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In the cross-ownership case where there is one owner of both teams in the market,
the profit function is given by pia1 =
[
φ1 + φ2
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
− tb1
tb1+tb2
)]
σa1
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
)
− ta1 +[
φ3 + φ4
(
tb1
tb1+tb2
− ta1
ta1+ta2
)]
σb1
(
tb1
tb1+tb2
)
− tb1 and the winning percentage is given by,
wa1 =
σa1(2φ2−φ1+wb1φ2)+σb1wb1φ4−1+
√
[σa1(2φ2−φ1+wb1φ2)+σb1wb1φ4−1]2+8σa1φ2(σa1(φ1−wb1φ2)−σb1wb1φ4)
4σa1φ2
These mathematical derivations are given in Appendix B.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium winning percentage for a large market team under a
monopoly, duopoly and cross-ownership for various values of wb1. With these parameter
values the monopolist invests less in talent then the duopolist or cross-owners if wb1 is
low and the reverse is true if wb1 is high. Furthermore, the duopolist always invests at
least as much as the cross-owner showing that the cross-owner has less of an incentive to
invest in talent. Given our specifications, this difference is magnified when wb1 is high.
While wb1 is irrelevant for the monopolist, and can be treated as exogenous for the
duopolist, it is not exogenous for the cross-owner. Therefore, if we make the further
assumption that the two leagues are completely symmetrical, we can derive talent levels,
winning percentages and profit levels for all given structures. If the two leagues are in
fact symmetrical, the equilibria in Figure 2 would be where the lines cross a 45 degree
line. Table 3 gives values for the various equilibria. Of note is the fact that profit from
one team is actually higher for the duopolist (1.228) compared to the cross-owner (1.196).
This is because talent levels increase for teams outside the region.
Figure 3 and Table 3 also give results when team 1 in league a and team 1 in league b
are in a small market. In this case the monopolist always invests more than the duopolist
and cross-owner. Also, profit increases with cross-ownership compared to the duopolist.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that if sports fans make consumption choices based on the quality of
all of the teams located in their markets that indirect competition and the ownership
structure alters an owner’s incentive to invest in talent. We find that more loyal fans
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reduce an owner’s incentive to invest in talent. In addition, economic competition results
in ambiguous levels of talent investment. Also, a firm that is engaged in cross-ownership
(owning two teams in different leagues in the same market) will invest less in talent
compared to a duoplist, but the difference in profits is ambiguous. In addition, league
policies can have an effect on the quality of teams in other leagues and revenue sharing
mitigates some of the dulling effects that cross-ownership has on an owner’s incentive to
invest in talent.
This analysis gives insight into how to generate more competitive balance. For exam-
ple, supposing MLB wanted more competitive balance, some outcomes may work better
than others. While it is often assumed that putting a third team in New York would
help balance by lowering the quality of the incumbent New York teams, that completely
depends on the nature of the baseball fans there. However, if the NFL lifted their salary
cap (and assuming New York football teams would then improve), this would help the
balance in MLB. Furthermore, revenue sharing in the NBA might help if it increases the
quality of basketball teams in New York. Finally, if New York baseball teams were jointly
owned with New York NHL teams, it might help the balance of MLB.
Extensions to this work are plenty. The opportunity for empirical work is clear. The
effect of cross-ownership on league expansion and relocation is an important issue to be
fully understood by economists, owners, league policy makers, and governments. A model
can be developed to show that both the number of teams in a league and the location
of teams are influenced by cross-ownership. In addition, the model in this paper can
be extended to analyze the effects of indirect competition and ownership structure on
competitive balance and players’ salaries. Further study intended to gain understanding
into the pricing effects and efficiency gains caused by cross-ownership is worthwhile.
Models that examine the effects of ownership structures in professional sports, beyond
cross-ownership, would also be welcome additions to the literature. Finally, the study
of indirect substitutes might be more important in sports than other industries because
territorial rights have eliminated almost all direct competition.
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A Appendix
In Appendix A, we examine the effect of an increase in the marginal revenue on winning.
In a two team league, assume the profit functions are,
pi1 = R1(m,w1(t1, t2))− t1 (22)
and
pi2 = R2(w2(t2, t1))− t2 (23)
where R is revenue, m is a variable representing the market, w is the team’s winning
percentage and t represents talent investment. We further suppose that team 2’s market
does not change, but for team 1, an increase in m leads to an increase in team 1’s marginal
revenue curve. As in the rest of the paper, we assume dRi
dwi
> 0, ∂wi
∂ti
> 0, ∂
2wi
∂t2i
< 0, ∂wi
∂tj
< 0,
∂Ri
∂ti
> 0, and ∂
2Ri
∂t2i
< 0. The first order conditions are,
∂pi1
∂t1
= MR1(m,w1(t1, t2))
∂w1
∂t1
− 1 = 0 (24)
and
∂pi2
∂t2
= MR2(w2(t2, t1))
∂w2
∂t2
− 1 = 0 (25)
Where MR is the marginal revenue function, dR
dw
, and is a function of the team’s winning
percentage, and in team 1’s case, an increasing function in m, so that dMR1
dm
> 0. Totally
differentiating (24) and (25) gives us
MR1
[
∂2w1
∂t21
dt1 +
∂2w1
∂t1∂t2
dt2
]
+
∂w1
∂t1
[
∂MR1
∂m
dm+
∂MR1
∂w1
(
∂w1
∂t1
dt1 +
∂w1
∂t2
dt2
)]
= 0
(26)
and
MR2
[
∂2w2
∂t22
dt2 +
∂2w2
∂t2∂t1
dt1
]
+
∂w2
∂t2
∂MR2
∂w2
(
∂w2
∂t2
dt2 +
∂w2
∂t1
dt1
)
= 0 (27)
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From these equations we find that
dt1
dm
=
−∂w1
∂t1
∂MR1
∂m
∂2R2
∂t22
∂2R1
∂t21
∂2R2
∂t22
− ∂2R1
∂t1∂t2
∂2R2
∂t2∂t1
(28)
and
dt2
dm
=
−∂w1
∂t1
∂MR1
∂m
∂2R2
∂t2∂t1
∂2R1
∂t1∂t2
∂2R2
∂t2∂t1
− ∂2R1
∂t21
∂2R2
∂t22
(29)
where ∂
2Ri
∂t2i
= ∂MRi
∂wi
(
∂wi
∂ti
)2
MRi
∂2wi
∂t2i
and ∂
2Ri
∂ti∂tj
= MRi
∂2wi
∂ti∂tj
+ ∂MRi
∂wi
∂wi
∂ti
∂wi
∂tj
. Since dw1
dm
=
∂w1
∂t1
dt1
dm
+ ∂w1
∂t2
dt2
dm
, this implies that,
dw1
dm
=
∂MR1
∂m
∂w1
∂t1
 ∂w1∂t1 ∂2R2∂t22 + ∂2R2∂t2∂t1 ∂w2∂t2
∂2R1
∂t1∂t2
∂2R2
∂t2∂t1
− ∂2R2
∂t22
∂2R1
∂t21
 (30)
The sign of equation (30) is ambiguous. However, if the talent investment of team 1
does not change the marginal benefit of talent investment for team 2, ∂
2R2
∂t2∂t1
= 0, then an
increase in team 1’s marginal revenue will increase their winning percentage.
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B Appendix
We assume the duopolist’s profit function is given by,
pia1 =
[
φ1 + φ2
(
ta1
ta1 + ta2
− wb1
)]
σa1
(
ta1
ta1 + ta2
)
− ta1 (31)
and the profit function for the other team in the same league is given by
pia2 =
(
ta2
ta1 + ta2
)
− ta2 (32)
The first order conditions are given by
∂pia1
∂ta1
= σa1
ta2
(ta1 + ta2)
2
[
2φ2
ta1
ta1 + ta2
+ φ1 − φ2wb1
]
− 1 = 0 (33)
and
∂pia2
∂ta2
=
ta1
(ta1 + ta2)
2 − 1 = 0 (34)
Given the first order conditions and nature of the contest success function, we know that
ta1 = (ta1 + ta2)
2, wa1 = ta1 + ta2 and wa1 +wa2 = 1. Using this and setting the first order
conditions equal to each other gives us,
[−2σa1φ2]w2a1 + [2σa1φ2 − φ1 + wb1φ2 − 1]wa1 + [φ1 − wb1φ2] = 0 (35)
and using the quadratic formula gives us
wa1 =
2σa1φ2 − φ1 + wb1φ2 − 1 +
√
(2σa1φ2 − φ1 + wb1φ2 − 1)2 + 8σ2a1φ2 (φ1 − wb1φ2)
4σa1φ2
(36)
(adding the root instead of subtracting it gives negative winning percentages in some
cases).
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In the cross-ownership case the profit function is given by
pia1 =
[
φ1 + φ2
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
− tb1
tb1+tb2
)]
σa1
(
ta1
ta1+ta2
)
− ta1 +[
φ3 + φ4
(
tb1
tb1+tb2
− ta1
ta1+ta2
)]
σb1
(
tb1
tb1+tb2
)
− tb1 (37)
and the profit function for the other team in the same league is given by
pia2 =
(
ta2
ta1 + ta2
)
− ta2 (38)
The first order conditions are given by
∂pia1
∂ta1
= σa1
ta2
(ta1 + ta2)
2
[
2φ2
ta1
ta1 + ta2
+ φ1 − φ2wb1
]
− 1− wb1σb1φ4 ta2
(ta1 + ta2)
2 = 0 (39)
and
∂pia2
∂ta2
=
ta1
(ta1 + ta2)
2 − 1 = 0 (40)
Again, given that ta1 = (ta1 + ta2)
2, wa1 = ta1 + ta2 and wa1 + wa2 = 1, using this and
setting the first order conditions equal to each other gives us,
[−2σa1φ2]w2a1+[σa1 (2φ2 − φ1 + wb1φ2) + wb1σb1φ4 − 1]wa1+[σa1 (φ1 − wb1φ2)− wb1σb1φ4] = 0
(41)
and using the quadratic formula gives us
wa1 =
σa1(2φ2−φ1+wb1φ2)+σb1wb1φ4−1
4σa1φ2
+
√
[σa1(2φ2−φ1+wb1φ2)+σb1wb1φ4−1]2+8σa1φ2(σa1(φ1−wb1φ2)−σb1wb1φ4)
4σa1φ2
(42)
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Table 1: Average Local Broadcast and Cable Ratings in the NBA (1999-2000 to 2004-
2005)
Market Team Broadcast Cable Competitors* Population Rank
Salt Lake City Jazz 11 4.4 0 22
San Antonio Spurs 10.2 6.4 0 8
Portland Trailblazers 10.2 2.6 0 19
Sacramento Kings 9.4 4.4 0 22
Memphis Grizzlies 5.6 2.2 0 12
Orlando Magic 4 3.4 0 28
Average 8.4 3.9 0.0 18.5
Indianapolis Pacers 8 4.3 1 11
Milwaukee Bucks 4.7 2.4 1 13
Charlotte/New Orleans** Hornets 2.5 1.6 1 20
Charlotte Bobcats 1.6 N/A 1 14
Average 4.2 2.8 1.0 14.5
Houston Rockets 4.4 2.4 2 3
Seattle Supersonics 4 3.4 2 16
Cleveland Cavaliers 3.8 2.4 2 21
Average 4.1 2.7 2.0 13.3
Detroit Pistons 5.1 3 3 10
Phoenix Suns 4.7 2.6 3 7
Dallas Mavericks 4.4 2.4 3 9
Minneapolis Timberwolves 3.5 2.2 3 27
Philadelphia 76ers 3.3 2.8 3 6
Miami Heat 2.9 1.5 3 26
Denver Nuggets 2.5 1.9 3 18
Washington D.C. Wizards 1.9 1.7 3 17
Atlanta Hawks 1.2 0.7 3 24
Boston Celtics N/A 1.6 3 15
Average 3.3 2.0 3.0 15.9
Los Angeles Lakers 5.5 3.8 4 4
Chicago Bulls 4.2 1.7 4 2
Los Angeles Clippers 2.5 0.6 4 4
Average 4.1 2.0 4.0 3.3
San Francisco Warriors 1.4 1.3 5 25
Average 1.4 1.3 5.0 25.0
New York Nets 0.5 0.7 8 1
New York Knicks N/A 1.8 8 1
Average 0.5 1.3 8.0 1.0
*Competitors represents the number of other MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL teams in the market.
**Competitor and population data for Charlotte/New Orleans refers to New Orleans.
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Table 2: Cross-Ownership between teams in the NBA, MLB, and NHL
Location Years NBA Team MLB Team NHL Team
Phoenix 1998 2004 Phoenix Suns Arizona Diamondbacks
Atlanta 1976-2003 Atlanta Hawks Atlanta Braves
1999-2003 Atlanta Hawks Atlanta Braves Atlanta Thrashers
2003-present Atlanta Hawks Atlanta Thrashers
Washington 1975-1999 Washington Wizards Washington Capitals
1999-2006 Washington Wizards Washington Capitals
Boston 1951-1963 Boston Celtics Boston Bruins
Chicago 1985-present Chicago Bulls Chicago White Sox
Dallas 1998-2010 Texas Rangers Dallas Stars
Denver 1995-1998 Denver Nuggets Colorado Avalanche
1998-2000 Denver Nuggets Colorado Avalanche
2000-present Denver Nuggets Colorado Avalanche
Detroit 1982-present Detroit Tigers Detroit Red Wings
Detroit/Tampa Bay 1997-2007 Detroit Pistons Tampa Bay Lightning
Los Angeles 1967-1979 Los Angeles Lakers Los Angeles Kings
1979-1988 Los Angeles Lakers Los Angeles Kings
1999-present Los Angeles Lakers Los Angeles Kings
1997-2005 Anaheim Angels Anaheim Ducks
Miami 1993-1998 Florida Marlins Florida Panthers
New York 1946-present New York Knicks New York Rangers
2000- 2004 New Jersey Nets New York Yankees New Jersey Devils
Philadelphia 1997-present Philadelphia 76ers Philadelphia Flyers
Toronto 1996-present Toronto Raptors Toronto Maple Leafs
Vancouver 1995-2001 Vancouver Grizzles Vancouver Canucks
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Table 3: Equilibria under various ownership structures and parameters
wa1 ta1 ta2 pia1
team 1 in league a is a large market
(σa1 = 3, σb1 = 3, φ1 = .8, φ2 = .2, φ4 = .2)
Monopolist 0.750 0.563 0.188 1.688
Duopolist 0.740 0.547 0.192 1.228
Cross-Owner 0.706 0.498 0.208 1.196*
team 1 in league a is a small market
(σa1 = .5, σb1 = .5, φ1 = .8, φ2 = .2, φ4 = .2)
Monopolist 0.333 0.111 0.222 0.056
Duopolist 0.301 0.090 0.210 0.030
Cross-Owner 0.286 0.082 0.204 0.033*
*The profit for the cross-owner is only profit from one of the teams.
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Figure 1: The number of markets with at least 1 team from each league (MLB, NBA,
and the NHL) and number of cross-owned firms.
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Figure 2: The monopolist’s, duopolist’s and cross-owned firm’s winning percentages
(σa1 = 3, σb1 = 3, φ1 = .8, φ2 = .2, φ4 = .2)
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Figure 3: The monopolist’s, duopolist’s and cross-owned firm’s winning percentages
(σa1 = .5, σb1 = .5, φ1 = .8, φ2 = .2, φ4 = .2)
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